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PREVIEW; Nunez v. Watchtower: The Constitutional 
Implications of Montana’s Statutory Cap on Punitive Damages 
and Negligence Per Se Under Montana’s Child Abuse 
Reporting Statute 
 
Joseph E. Gresham* 
 
The Montana Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral 
arguments in this matter on Friday, September 13, 2019, at 10:00 
a.m. at the Northern Hotel in Billings, MT. Bradley J. Luck will 
likely appear on behalf of the Petitioners. James P. Molloy will 
likely appear on behalf of the Respondents.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 This case presents the Court with two significant issues. The 
core issue before the Court is whether Montana’s statutory cap1 of 
$10 million on punitive damages comports with Montana’s 
Constitution.2 The second issue before the Court is whether 
Petitioners Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. 
(“Watchtower”) and The Christian Congregation of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses (“CCJW”) are liable to Respondent Alexis Nunez 
(“Nunez”), a congregant at Petitioner Montana’s Thompson Falls 
Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (“TFC”) for failure to report 
sexual abuse under Montana’s child abuse reporting statute.3 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 In 2004, two congregants informed a TFC Elder that 
Maximo Reyes, another congregant, sexually abused them when 
they were children.4 Subsequently, the TFC Elders contacted CCJW 
and the legal department at Watchtower for spiritual counsel and 
 
* J.D. / M.B.A. Candidate, Blewett School of Law Class of 2021. 
1 MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–220(3) (2017). 
2 See generally Respondent’s Response Brief at 37–47, Nunez v. Watchtower, 
(Mont. July 22, 2019) (No. DA 19-0077); Brief of Attorney General at 4–5, 
Nunez v. Watchtower, (Mont. July 24, 2019) (No. DA 19-0077). 
3 See generally Petitioner’s Opening Brief, Nunez v. Watchtower, (Mont. May 
22, 2019) (No. DA 19-0077); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–201 (2017). 
4 Id. at 4–8. 
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legal advice about the reports of Reyes’ abuse. 5 Then, CCJW and 
Watchtower instructed TFC elders not to report the allegations to 
Montana authorities and to keep the situation confidential.6 TFC 
complied with these requests, and the abuse continued.7 
 
 Following a realization that TFC failed to report child abuse 
because of CCJW’s and Watchtowers’ instruction, two of Reyes’ 
victims, Nunez and Holly McGowan, sued in Montana District 
Court.  They then filed for summary judgment, alleging liability as 
a matter of law because Petitioners knew of Reyes’ abuse and failed 
to report it, which violated Montana’s mandatory reporting law.8 
Petitioners cross-filed and contended that the failure to comply with 
the reporting statute was excused.9  
  
 At trial, the Court instructed the Jury that TFC, CCJW, and 
Watchtower were liable to Nunez under the doctrine of negligence 
per se under the mandatory reporting statute, the jury awarded her 
$4 million in compensatory damages and $31 million in punitive 
damages.10 Further, when reviewing the award, the District Court 
declared Montana’s punitive damages cap unconstitutional and 
entered the jury’s verdict in full.11 Accordingly, CCJW and 
Watchtower appealed to the Montana Supreme Court. 
 
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
 In 2003, the Montana Legislature enacted a “$10 million or 
3% of a defendant’s net worth, whichever is less” cap on non-class 
action punitive damages.12 Further, in order to levy punitive 
 
5 Id. at 8–10 (describing the role of each appealing party: congregations of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses receive spiritual counsel, hear confessions, and provide 
spiritual discipline from groups of local elders, like the ones at TFC. When 
faced with an issue, local elders seek spiritual guidance from CCJW and legal 
counsel from Watchtower, New York corporations set up by Jehovah’s 
Witnesses).  
6 Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 10. 
7 Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 1–2, Nunez v. Watchtower, (Mont. Aug. 14, 2019) 
(No. DA 19-0077). 
8 Id. at 9. 
9 Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 2. 
10 Id. at 11 (The jury found against McGowan and awarded her no damages). 
11 Id. at 12. 
12 MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–220(3) (2017).  
2019  PREVIEW: NUNEZ V. WATCHTOWER 12 
 
damages, a jury must find the defendant guilty of actual malice,13 
then, they must evaluate the defendant’s financial background and 
then submit the damage determination to the judge for review.14 
While reviewing the reasonableness of the award, the judge takes 
into account nine factors and is authorized to change the award 
accordingly.15 The Legislature enacted the punitive damages cap in 
response to the perceived consequences of unfettered punitive 
damages, including increased costs of insurance premiums, swollen 
costs of litigation, and adverse effects on businesses.16 For 
comparison, as of 2016, only four states have statutory punitive 
damages caps that resemble Montana’s limitations based on 
defendant’s net worth and a specified amount.17  
  
 During the 2019 legislative session, Governor Bullock 
signed HB 640, which updated laws relating to childhood sexual 
abuse, namely Montana’s child abuse reporting statute.18 The 
Legislature made the punishment for failure to report sexual abuse 
a felony,19 and applied it retroactively.20 The reporting law requires 
professionals, including clergy, that have reasonable cause to 
suspect, via information about abuse obtained through their official 
capacity, to report sexual abuse promptly to authorities.21 There is 
 
13 Id. at § 27–1–221(1)(2) (“A defendant is guilty of actual malice if the 
defendant as knowledge of facts and deliberately proceeds to act in conscious 
disregard of the high probability of injury to the plaintiff”). 
14 Id. at § 27–1–221(7)(a). 
15 Id. at § 27–1–221(7)(b)(i)–(ix) (“(i) the reprehensibility of defendant’s 
wrongdoing; (ii) the extent of the defendant’s wrongdoing; (iii) the intent of the 
defendant in committing the wrong; (iv) the profitability of defendant’s 
wrongdoing, if applicable; (v) the amount of actual damages awarded by the 
jury; (vi) defendant’s net worth; (vii) previous awards of punitive damages 
based upon the same act; (viii) potential or prior criminal sanctions against the 
defendant based on the same wrongful act; and (ix) any other circumstances that 
may operate to increase or reduce, without wholly defeating, punitive 
damages.”).  
16 Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2 at 2. 
17 Paige Griffith, Why Don’t Punitive Damages Punish or Deter? Beyond the 
Constitution toward an Economic Solution, 77 MONT. L. REV. 328, 341 (2016). 
18 Amy Beth Hanson, New Montana Law Ends Statute of Limitations on Child 
Sex Abuse, May 7, 2019, GREAT FALLS TRIBUNE, https://perma.cc/7KSF-3ZGY. 
19 Ch. 367, 2019 Mont. Laws § 8 (to be codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–
207(3)); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–207(3) (2017) (previously, the punishments 
for all failures to report were misdemeanors).  
20 Ch. 367, 2019 Mont. Laws § 18. 
21 MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–201(1)–(2) (2017). 
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an exception for clergy if the information was intended to be a part 
of a confidential communication between the clergy and 
congregant.22 Lastly, any official or institution who is obligated 
under the law that fails to report abuse or reasonably prevent another 
from doing so is civilly liable for the damages proximately caused 
by such failure or prevention.23 
 
A. Petitioners’ Arguments 
 Petitioners argue that Montana’s $10 million statutory cap 
on punitive damages is presumptively constitutional and thus the 
District Court should not have entered judgment in full.24 Petitioners 
assert that, under a rational basis review,25 the punitive damages cap 
comports with substantive due process26 because it is reasonably 
related to legislative purposes such as limiting costs of litigation 
settlements or insurance premiums.27 Second, Petitioners argue that 
the punitive damages cap satisfies equal protection28 because, under 
a rational basis review,29 there are “real differences” between class 
action and individual plaintiffs—namely, the legislative allowance 
for higher awards because harms involved in class actions affect 
numerous people, are more substantial, and must be divided.30 
Lastly, Petitioners argue that the punitive damages cap does not 
infringe on the right to a jury trial31 since there is no constitutional 
right to punitive damages and the Legislature may divest the jury of 
determining them in the first place.32 Concerning the punitive 
damages award, Petitioners argue that it exceeds the limit of due 
process, mainly because Respondent failed to adequately prove 
 
22 Id. at § 41–3–201(6)(ii). 
23 Id. at § 41–3–207(1). 
24 Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 46; Brief of Attorney General, 
supra note 2, at 6 (Attorney General Fox intervenes solely to defend the 
constitutionality of the punitive damages cap); Errata at 2, Nunez v. Watchtower, 
(Mont. Aug. 26, 2019) (No. DA 19-0077). 
25 Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2, at 15. 
26 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 17. 
27 Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 46–47; see also Brief of Attorney 
General, supra note 2, at 16–21.  
28 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
29 Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 49–50.  
30 See Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2, at 18–15.  
31 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 26. 
32 Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2, 22–28.  
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Watchtower’s actions, in instructing TFC not to report, constituted 
malice.33 
 
Petitioners argue that they preserved all issues relating to 
negligence per se because they objected to the jury instructions and 
the verdict form during the latter half of the bifurcated trial.34 
Otherwise, Petitioners present four arguments in favor of a reversal 
of summary judgment on negligence per se.35 First, Petitioners argue 
that the reporting law does not apply because the common law bases 
of vicarious liability and agency do not subsume organizations like 
Watchtower and CCJW as liable under the reporting law.36 Second, 
Petitioners maintain that they fall under the reporting law’s 
confidentiality exemption because the information of sexual abuse 
was shared exclusively amongst clergy, within the confines of 
doctrine and established practice, and at the risk of infringing on 
First Amendment rights.37 Third, Petitioners argue that Nunez is not 
among the “class of persons,” protected by the reporting law 
because Respondents presented no evidence that CCJW or 
Watchtower knew “anything about her.”38 Finally, Petitioners argue 
that negligence per se does not automatically establish proximate 
cause under the reporting law because a jury must determine 
whether the violation was a proximate cause of the alleged harm.39 
 
B. Respondents’ Arguments 
 Initially, Respondents argue that Petitioners failed to 
preserve all issues on appeal except those relating to punitive 
damages because Petitioners failed to object to jury instructions and 
stipulated to the verdict form that determined liability.40 
 
 Respondents primarily argue that the punitive damages cap 
of $10 million is unconstitutional because it violates three tenants of 
Montana’s Constitution: due process, equal protection, and right to 
 
33 Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 7, at 22–25. 
34 Id. at 4. 
35 See generally Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 13–15. 
36 Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 7, at 4 
37 Id. at 16–17.  
38 Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 33–36. 
39 Id. at 36–39. 
40 Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 10.  
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trial by jury.41 First, Respondents argue that the punitive damages 
cap violates due process since a “one-size-fits-all” legislative 
imposition fails to fulfill the purposes of the cap to deter and punish 
because of its failure to adequately address the net worth of wealthy 
defendants.42 Similarly, Respondents argue that, under a rational-
basis test, the punitive damages cap violates equal protection 
because it does not equally apply the claimant’s sole mechanism for 
deterrence and punishment, and that cost-control fails as the only 
justification for doing so.43 Further, Respondents argue that the 
punitive damages cap infringes on the right to trial by jury because, 
under strict scrutiny,44 the punitive damages cap usurps the jury’s 
duty to assess appropriate damages to punish and deter egregious 
conduct.45 Considering the award of punitive damages, Respondents 
argue Petitioners failure to report, even after knowledge of the 
abuse, constitutes malice and that the award is reasonable and 
comports with due process.46 
 
Additionally, Respondents argue that the District Court was 
correct in granting summary judgment on negligence per se. First, 
Respondents argue that Petitioners are liable under theories of 
vicarious liability and agency because the reporting law does not 
abrogate common law.47 Also, Respondents point out that at all 
times relevant to the underlying acts, Petitioners acted according to 
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ policies and practices and did so in 
furtherance of the interests of their church.48 Second, Respondents 
argue that the confidentiality exception to the reporting law does not 
apply because there was broad disclosure of the abuse and no 
requirement to keep such information confidential.49 Third, 
Respondents argue that Nunez is a member of the class of protected 
 
41 Id. at 37.  
42 Id. at 39. 
43 Id. at 37–38 (arguing that the punitive damages cap violates equal protection 
because it does not equally address the (1) disparity in wealth between potential 
offenders and (2) unfairly distinguishes individual plaintiffs from class action 
plaintiffs). 
44 Id. at 40 (citing Snetsinger, infra note 57, at 450 (holding that “strict scrutiny 
applies if a suspect class or fundamental right is affected.”).) 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 12–13. 
47 Id. at 12. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 30–31. 
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persons under the reporting law, because they had evidence that 
Petitioners had reason to suspect Reyes’ abuse.50 Lastly, 
Respondents argue that all Petitioners were the proximate cause of 
Nunez’s harm because they knew of Reyes’ propensities and did 
nothing to stop him.51 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Montana’s $10 Million Statutory Cap on Punitive Damages  
 If the Court decides to address whether the punitive damages 
cap is constitutional, then its decision will likely hinge on review of 
the caps’ constitutional implications regarding substantive due 
process, equal protection, and right to a jury trial.52 First, under a 
rational basis review,53 whether the punitive damages cap satisfies 
substantive due process depends on the Court’s prioritization of the 
cap’s purpose; whether it is there primarily for cost-control 
purposes,54 or to deter and punish egregious conduct.55 Punitive 
damages, by statute, are levied “for the sake of example and for the 
purpose of punishing a defendant.”56 The Respondent advances this 
argument and will likely prevail. Next, the Court will likely find that 
the equal protection issue requires a strict scrutiny analysis because 
the punitive damages cap imposes different burdens on different 
classes of persons.57 Here, “real differences” aside,58 the Court will 
likely note that, according to the plain text of the statute, individual 
plaintiffs are restricted in their recoveries, but class action plaintiffs 
 
50 Id. at 26–30 (citing Gross v. Myers 748 P.2d 459 (Mont. 1987) (where a report 
was deemed reasonable when mandatory reporter was notified of and reported 
abuse out of concern for abuser’s grandchildren). 
51 Id. at 24–26.  
52 See generally Montana Cannabis Industry Ass’n v. State, 368 P.3d 1131 
(Mont. 2016) (establishing a plenary standard of review when reviewing the 
constitutionality of state statutes); Griffith, supra note 17, (analyzing the 
punitive damages cap in a Montana context, especially its economic and 
constitutional implications). 
53 Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2 at 15. 
54 Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 46–47; See also Brief of Attorney 
General, supra note 2, at 16–21.  
55 Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 39. 
56 MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–220(1) (2017). 
57 Snetsinger v. Montana Univ. System, 104 P.3d 445, 449–50 (Mont. 2004). 
58 Brief of Attorney General, supra note 2, at 18–15. 
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are not.59 Lastly, the Court has reasoned that because they implicate 
a fundamental right, laws that restrict the jury’s authority are subject 
to strict scrutiny.60 Further, statute enumerates that, “liability for 
punitive damages must be determined by the trier of fact.”61 Here, 
the Court might reason the punitive damages cap is a seizure of a 
jury’s duty to determine damages to effectively deter and punish 
offenders.62 
 
Outside the constitutional implications, the Court will likely 
consider whether the award was “grossly excessive,” as both parties 
address the reasonableness of the award. 63 In Seltzer v. Morton,64 
the Montana Supreme Court avoided reviewing the constitutionality 
of the punitive damages cap, but held that a reduced $20 million jury 
punitive damages award to $9.9 million was reasonable under the 
guideposts established by the U.S. Supreme Court in BMW of North 
America, Inc. v. Gore.65 The Gore guideposts consider three things: 
(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the underlying conduct; (2) the 
ratio between compensatory and punitive damages; and (3) 
sanctions for comparable misconduct when determining whether or 
not an award is “grossly excessive.”66 First, the Petitioners’ contend 
that the conduct was “at most, good-faith nonfeasance,”67and 
Respondents argue that the failure to report satisfies the required test 
of reprehensibility.68 Paired with reports demonstrating the lengths 
to which Jehovah’s Witness officials have gone to protect the church 
interests,69 the Court may find it challenging to consider Petitioners’ 
actions merely a “good-faith nonfeasance,” and will be more likely 
 
59 MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–220(3) (2017). 
60 Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 554 P.3d 1, 12 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J., 
concurring). 
61 MONT. CODE ANN. § 27–1–221(7). 
62 Id. at § 27–1–220(1). 
63 See Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 51–54; Respondent’s 
Response Brief, supra note 2, at 41. 
64 154 P.3d 561 (Mont. 2007).  
65 517 U.S. 559 (1996).  
66 Id. at 574–584. 
67 Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 54. 
68 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003). 
69 See generally Daniel Avery, U.S., New Law Could Open Floodgates on 
Decades of Child Sexual Abuse with Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mar. 22, 2019, 
NEWSWEEK, https://perma.cc/8DS9-UNAT; Douglas Quenqua, Family, A Secret 
Database of Child Abuse, Mar. 22, 2019, THE ATLANTIC, 
https://perma.cc/HGW5-ESLR.  
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to rule the underlying conduct reprehensible. On the second 
guidepost, it is likely the Court will side with Respondents. Even 
though Campbell and Gore show ratios that were deemed outside 
the “limit of the due process guarantee,”70 here, the damages will 
likely be deemed reasonable given the harm to Nunez and the 
deemed reasonable Seltzer ratio of 9.9:1.71 Lastly, this Court is the 
best entity to analyze the third guidepost.72 Facially, the conduct in 
question is Petitioners’ failure to report sexual abuse to Montana 
authorities and the criminal penalty is now a felony.73 If this Court 
focuses on the underlying conduct alone, the failure to report, 
Petitioners are likely to prevail on this front. However, if this Court 
zooms out to include the multiple years of abuse to multiple 
victims,74 and the prolonged failure to report,75 the outcome on the 
third guidepost will likely favor Respondents. 
 
Recently, Montana juries have handed down punitive 
damages in excess of the punitive damages cap, but the Court has 
ultimately avoided the question of constitutionality.76 Here, both 
parties touch on all three constitutional bases that Montana attorneys 
utilize and advance cogent arguments about the reasonableness of 
 
70 Campbell, supra note 68, at 429 (holding that an award of $145 million in 
punitive damages on a compensatory damages award of $1 million violated due 
process); Gore, supra note 65, at 582 (holding that an award of $2 million in 
punitive damages on $4,000 of compensatory damages was “grossly 
excessive”). 
71 Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 52 (noting a different approach 
than Respondents to what the ratio actually is—either 7.5 to 1 according to 
Respondents, or 9.4 to 1 according to Petitioners). 
72 Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 441 
(explaining that the “third Gore criterion, which calls for a broad legal 
comparison, seems more suited to the expertise of the appellate courts”). 
73 Ch. 367, 2019 Mont. Laws § 8 (to be codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–
207(3)). 
74 Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 4–5. 
75 Id. at 6–9. 
76 See Masters Group International, Inc. v. Comerica Bank, 352 P.3d 1101 
(Mont. 2015) (Holding that a choice of law conflict precluded the District Court 
from rendering the punitive damages cap unconstitutional); Order on Motion to 
Dismiss at 1, Olson v. Hyundai Motor Co. (Mont. Jan. 14, 2015) (No. DA 14-
0500) (case dismissal due to settlement between the parties where punitive 
damages cap was declared unconstitutional at District Court); Joint Motion to 
Dismiss at 2, Kelly Logging, Inc. v. First Interstate Bank (Mont. Sept. 15, 2015) 
(No. DV 12-928) (case dismissal due to settlement between the parties where 
punitive damages cap was declared unconstitutional at District Court). 
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the award.77 Because these positions have been recently addressed 
at the trial level, it is likely the Court will finally resolve the issue of 
whether the punitive damages cap is constitutional, and if not, at 
least look at the reasonableness of the award upon adjustment to 
comport with the cap. 
 
B. Negligence Per Se 
If the Court determines the issues concerning negligence per 
se are preserved on appeal, which may be difficult given the 
disparity between the parties’ procedural contentions, four disputes 
between the parties will be reviewed. First, the parties disagree as to 
whether common law doctrines of agency and vicarious liability 
apply to Watchtower and CCJW. An agency relationship arises 
when a principal manifests assent to another person that the agent 
shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s 
control.78 In determining agency, the Court will likely look at the 
facts that TFC Elders, CCJW Elders, and Watchtower attorneys all 
interacted with one another under Jehovah’s Witness practices and 
doctrine and did so primarily concerned with furthering principals 
CCJW and Watchtower’s interests. Following an agency 
determination, vicarious liability still exists for principals under the 
reporting law because, even though agents were the negligent actors, 
their principal is not immune from tort liability for failure to protect 
a victim.79 Here, the law,80 is clear that civil liability is imposed on 
any institution that “prevents another person” from reporting a child 
abuser, especially when agents knew of Reyes’ history of abuse, and 
watched Reyes’ attend church with Nunez, whom he continued to 
abuse.81 
Generally, in order to be considered confidential under the 
reporting statute, a communication is required to be confidential by 
canon law, church doctrine, or established church practice.82 Here, 
since there was broad disclosure of the abuse (including to Reyes’ 
wife and other victims), and there was no showing that keeping 
information about a congregant’s child abuse was required by 
 
77 Griffith, supra note 17, at 343. 
78 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Am. Law Inst. 2006).  
79 Newville v. Department of Family Servs. 883 P.2d 793, 812 (Mont. 1994). 
80 MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–207 (2017). 
81 Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 22–24. 
82 MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–201(6)(c) (2017). 
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canon,83 the Court will likely dismiss Petitioners’ argument that the 
failure to disclose communications is exempted because of 
confidentiality. Third, Petitioner is indeed within the “class of 
persons” protected by the reporting law because of previously 
established vicarious liability and the fact that every party knew of 
Reyes’ history of abuse. Fourth, and finally, the Court will look to 
the fact that all parties involved knew of Reyes’ capabilities of 
sexually abuse young children, thus establishing Petitioners’ 
proximate cause for the harm of any child within this context. On all 
four fronts, the Court is likely to hold Petitioners liable for 
Respondents’ harm, because their primary concern was to act in 
furtherance of the interests of the church, not to protect Nunez.84 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 As demonstrated by the Court’s repeated avoidance on the 
issue of the constitutionality of Montana’s punitive damages cap, 
this case presents an excellent opportunity for the Court to silence 
or empower juries and trial judges across Montana as they make 
determinations about punitive damages. On the negligence per se 
front, the Court will likely flesh out the religious confidentiality 
exception to the reporting law and establish that vicarious liability 
applies to institutions involved in collective efforts to withhold 
information about child sexual abuse from Montana authorities. 
Ultimately, the Court’s decision will shape punitive damage 
determinations and reporting law litigation on a negligence per se 
basis for years to come. 
 
 
83 Respondent’s Response Brief, supra note 2, at 30–33 (emphasis added). 
84 Id. at 12. 
